The Situation on 20th March 1944.

This day 75 years ago marks the high-water mark of danger to Imphal. The Japanese still had the initiative and progress since they crossed the Chindwin was as good as expected. Mutaguchi was characteristically bullish. The Japanese troops were only a few days into the three weeks of supplies they carried and so their logistic limitations were not yet evident.

In the south on the Tiddim Road the Japanese had the upper hand. They had trapped 17 Infantry Division forcing Corps Commander Lt Gen Scoones to send his most of his reserve south from Imphal to rescue them.

In the Kabaw Valley the Yamamoto force had forced the withdrawal of 2 Border after a series of attacks at Witok which were costly for the Japanese. They had not quite managed to trap 2 Border but were harrying them back up the Kabaw Valley. The 2 Border withdraw was chaotic and it must have looked like very much like business as usual for the attacking Japanese, namely Allied units withdrawing when threatened from behind. Maj Gen Yamamoto had sent the Itou force around to try and cut off 20th Division which remained obligingly forward in Moreh because Divisional commander Major General Gracey did not want to withdraw as ordered. Yamamoto held back from pressing on Tamu and then Moreh from the Kabaw Valley because he wanted Itou to achieve the cut off before he did so.

31st Dvision were making good progress toward Kohima and the battle at Sangshak had just started.

At this point Slim had few reserves where he needed them. Dimapur was wide open. He did not at this point know a full Japanese division was going to Kohima because the map, captured at Sangshak which told him that, had not yet reached him.

The good news for Slim came from further afield. The Chindits had been successfully inserted. Better still Chinese 18th Division had finally after months, indeed years, of cajoling started an offensive in northern Burma. If Lt Gen Kawabe had any unease about this Chinese offensive he hoped it would be quickly relived by a rapid success at Imphal so he could switch the troops to counter this new threat.

The Chindwin and River Crossings


The Chindwin River separated the Japanese and Allies for most of 1943. It was crossed by the Chindits in early 1943 as they headed east to the Japanese rear areas. Then in March 1944 it was crossed west as the Japanese attacked Imphal. In late 1944 it was crossed again eastwards as Slim’s 14th Army reinvaded Burma. Each crossing involved more engineering effort than the last.

In March the river varies from 50 meters wide where it flows fast, to 500 meters across where it is more or less a lake with no flow. There are lots of points where you could wade across most of the river; but crucially never all of it. There are no reliable fords from one side to other because the sand bars shift too often. I was often surprised by people standing in the middle of the river and often saw bigger boats feeling their way forward in 4 feet of water.

In March 1944 the Japanese made a spectacular mess of the crossings with the 31st Division crossings in the north being the most problematic. Many drowned and much equipment was lost which is odd since the Japanese were used to crossing rivers. They had much respect for Allied engineering capability which they lacked.   However, river crossings have an unforgiving reality to them which no amount of determination, panache can overcome. Heavy stuff sinks; bushido (traditional Japanese warrior spirit) does not help. Also, people on water tend to all get into trouble at the same time as waves or currents affect all those present and panic spreads. The line between order and chaos is thin.

Is the Chindwin a major obstacle or not? Mutaguchi thought it was not but it all depends of the size of the force. A group of 900 odd Chindits would, and did, find places to cross with some ease providing it was in March. Later as the river rises it would be much harder. It was the Chindit crossings and his own observations which led Mutaguchi to think the Chindwin was not an obstacle worthy of a defensive line and could presumably be recrossed easily enough. The river’s lack of value as as defensive obstacle was part of the the logic for the Japanese moving forward and attacking Imphal.

But as soon as you need to get anything other than a few mules and some hardy infantry across, you need a bridge. The width of the river means that a hasty assault bridge needs to float, which means pontoons. The Chindwin offers a classic choice; shorter bridge at a narrow point and thus with lots of current-flow; or a longer bridge at a wider with less flow. Of course, road access, from each bank might in effect determine the crossing point as there is no point having a bridge no one can get to. 300 yard wide pontoon bridges are hard to control in even light currents and the rate of crossing such bridges is slow.  The good news is the Chindwin banks are easy to access, being most sandy and sloping, so getting in and out is not too hard. It is notable that when Slim crossed back again in late 1944, the crossing was a big event with lots of engineering support.

In early 1944, the Japanese thought they could cross the Chindwin like Chindits whereas they were actually much a bigger force. The Japanese force included 20,000 to 30,000 cattle herded by fighting soldiers who did not know how to control the beasts.  In any case cattle hate walking and are not that biddable. Burmese cattle to like to wallow in water but rarely swim. Most cattle in Burma take the afternoon off so even those that do work are not worked after midday. The few that can work a whole day trade at a higher price. (The intelligence value of markets?) I wonder if Mutaguchi knew this. This whole aspect of Mutaguchi’s plan was, surely, the height of hubris.

The Japanese also lacked air cover and consequently had to cross the Chindwin at night and broke their pontoon bridges to hide them from the RAF during the day. It was probably their exaggerated belief in the capabilities of the Japanese soldier which led to short cuts and attempts to wade across. This is nearly possible; but not quite. This in turn led to scenes of biblical destruction on some of the crossings which I will describe in the book. At Homalin the Allies, using patrols and air, managed to destroy 50% of the ammunition heading to Kohima. So you have to feel for the Japanese divisional staff trying to control the crossings. They clearly under estimated the task.

The Japanese in 1943.

My route north took me through Mutaguchi’s area of responsibility in 1943 on the east of the Chindwin.  The area is probably now more open but it seems perfect for guerrilla and Chindits operations. There are large open cultivated areas bounded with jungle to hide in. Maj Gen Yamamoto wrote a scathing account of life there in 1943; no food, not much to do, hard to get around. etc. And of course they had to chase elusive Chindits who seemed to go wherever they pleased. I quite see how unattractive it was  for the Japanese to simply wait there for the inevitable Allied attack. It was not the idea to attack Imphal that was flawed, it was how it was done.

Logistics and Engineering.

My Route: Moreh, Tamu, Witok. Kalewa. So I am now in the middle of the large no mans land which before the battle of Imphal, had separated the Japanese from the Allies. Some obvious things struck me.

I am sheepish that it took a journey to realise this obvious point. There was a big area of no mans land, broadly the Kabaw Valley between the two Armies at the start of 1944.  The side that defends, here the Allies, already owns the roads it needs for the battle. So the Allies did all kinds of work on the various roads going to where they intend to fight the Japanese eg Tiddim, Palel, Shenam etc. Whereas the attacker, here the Japanese cannot get at the roads it will need till after the attack. Eg Kabaw Valley until after the attack. Super obvious point. So it was not so much supply through mountainous terrain that was the problem Slim did not want. Rather it was supply across areas without roads which he could not get at in advance.

Kalewa where I was today is where the bulk of 33 Div crossed the Chindwin. Kalewa to Tamu took me 4 hours on a much improved road compared to 1944. There are about 53 small mostly Bailey bridges across chaungs which flood. About 5 of these had been washed away in the last year.

All to say I can understand the Japanese problem. Even on these two southern routes where they had the best pre existing roads there was nothing remotely suitable as a main supply route. As noted elsewhere the Japanese intelligence people had done a good job of knowing the ground but there is zero evidence this knowledge led to the engineering effort that would clearly be needed. In fairness Mutaguchi did ask for road building companies but was not given any.

I then went to a village which had been a Japanese supply hub and met and interviewed a 90 year old who had been there. They seemed to have got along just fine with the Japanese occupiers who mostly left them alone and were self sufficient in food.

Finally, Kalewa and the Japanese crossing site. I think the Chindwin was lower today than in March 1944. Nevertheless, it is not a tricky site. Wide lazy river. Decent approaches on drivable sandy beaches. The problem would have been monsoon in say May: river maybe twice as wide, flowing very fast so drag on pontoons needing some serious bank anchors. Centre of the pontoon bridge hard to control. AND most days the RAF come so it has to be taken apart and hidden. So you probably resort to ferries. Nightmare. You can quite see why supply at the front line was so poor.

13 March 1944- The Order to withdraw

Main Events

Heavy engagement with 20 Div in the Kabaw Valley.

17 Division south of Imphal are engaged from the front but also in depth and thus in danger of being cut off.

Lt Gen Scoones, Commander of 4 Corps in Imphal, gives the order to withdraw. (Imphal was really his battle)


Scoones decision to withdraw in accordance with Slim’s previously published concept of operations, is widely debated. Some said he gave the order too late. Well after the war, when Slim and Scoones debated this, they both agreed they had left it a bit late. Scoones however took the responsibility from Slim who rather strangely had claimed it was his error. I think post war Scoones felt a bit patronised by Slim.

The more controversial delay was at Divisional level. Cowan in 17 Div took 18 hours to pass on the order to withdraw although in his book, Slim defended Cowan. I have not time -racked all the original documents but such a major reorientation of a division from advance to withdraw could well have taken that amount of time, especially as they were not well prepared.

However, Gracey in 20 Div flatly refused to come back to Imphal. I found documents in Japan showing just how close 20 Div came to being cut off as well. The 17 Div delay I can understand. 20 Div was an avoidable muddle. Slim probably should have banged heads together.

The Kukis are the local tribe in the southern area of Imphal. Kohima is mostly Naga. I went the very remote Kuki village of Mombi to assess the only route that connected each of the 33 Japanese Div axis, the so called Mombi track. Not many history folk make it there probably because there was no fighting there.

Long story follows but the question is ‘Did the labour taken from India in WW1 get paid properly and if they were killed did they get pensions?’ I suspect not.

So the Kuki were hostile to the British following a war between about 1917 and 1921. The cause was too many Kuki were taken to France as labour in WW1 and nearly all did not come back. The Kuki felt enslaved (their word). Slaves are by definition forced and not paid. Not sure about the ‘forced’ element but they may very well have not been paid. The established Indian Army regiments had very efficient systems for paying pensions for those killed. It seems less likely such system existed for casually recruited, temporary workers from very remote areas, with no regimental structure. (There is a history PhD there for someone). Thus, the Kuki’s attitude to the Japanese arrival in the south was probably different to the Naga around Kohima. The latter were on the whole helpful to the British. Hemant Katoche covers this in his book.

9 March – 1944 written from Dimapur

Those with modern military service will recall the tedium of being moved by military movers: absurdly long waits, no information, incomprehensible routes and your own chain of command helpless. It was the same in 1944. An OIC train could perhaps decide meal times but if parked in a siding for twelve hours in the hot sun, he was helpless. My own recent civilian journey to Dimapur by train was a luxurious 38 hours albeit in a rather confined top bunk. The troops would surely have been irritable on arrival. A great many would have arrive at Dimapur as reinforcements so without mates. I thought about this as I gave myself a lite day after my ‘long’ journey. Their journey took two weeks in many cases and by the time I felt ready stroll over to Burma Camp after my train journey, they were already fighting.

Dimapur, is still the end point of the Indian rail network. In 1944 it was also a vast depot area which required thousands on thousands of local civilian workers. Their presence was a major dilemma wherever they were. In the forward depots like Moreh they were needed to run the depot so frontline troops could be supplied. But they also had to be fed and in case of attack they were a defenceless, responsibility. At Imphal they were likewise needed but also represented mouths to feed. So their evacuation was logical but the timing difficult and particularly at Moreh they filled up the road back at a critical moment.

On the 9 March 1944 Japanese 33 Division in the south and had crossed the Chindwin and were moving at speed to try and cut off first 17 Indian Division but also 20th Division in the Kabaw Valley. Some Japanese battalions were making 15 km per day but of course partly because they were so lightly equipped, which in the end was fatal. Others were taking apart whole trucks back to their chassis to man handle them up slopes. One unit had 200 men with mules to operate just 4 small mountain guns. It was all a lot of effort for a limited effect at the far end.

The Allies, specifically Lt Gen Scoones, were not yet fully aware of the attack. Both 17 and 20 Division had been aggressively patrolling, as had the Japanese, so the early sightings of movements needed to be of large numbers and in lots of places to break the previous pattern. V force had made a report of Iapanese movement but at this point a Japanese offensive had yet to be confirmed.

It is easy to forget that nearly everyone in both lead Allied Divisions thought they were about to re invade Burma. Ie to move forward not back. Some of the commanders who did know about the plan to withdraw to Imphal were stung by accusations they had left Burma in a bit too much of a hurry in 1942. Sittang Bridge which was prematurely blown was a particular source of unease. (Indeed when in Japan in 2018 I met a veteran who had befriended an Indian soldier who had been left in the far bank. He was so underwhelmed he had joined the Japanese as an orderly and remained with them for months.)

So at this point Lt Gen Scoones was under orders to only pull back to Imphal once he was sure this was a major attack. Reputations were at stake.

Pretending to everyone including your own units that you are about to attack whilst actually planning to pull back, must have been a particular problem in the depots. Attacking troops have different needs from defending troops; attacker need fuel, and defenders wire and mines. Some reporting suggests the staff were indeed confused and moving items forward pending the attack, while others were moving the same items back in case the depot was abandoned.

It was about now that 2 Bn Border Regiment meet the Japanese. The Border regiment were the forward battalion of 20 Division in the Kabaw Valley. (The Divisional commander Maj Gen Gracey very much did not want to withdraw).

The Border Regiment had a standing patrol well forward which engaged the Japanese. It then emerged the Japanese had tanks, so over the next few days there was something of a hiatus. The Borders had no anti tank weapons and only the commanding officer had ever seen one. The record shows they did get some but when the time came the Japanese tanks were killed by Allied tanks.

The Famine in Bengal

I have not spent time in the archives studying the famine. Most of my references are books by Indian economists. I am curious what effect the famine, a really large event, had on the Battle of Imphal which happened very soon afterwards and pretty close by.

Some generaliities. Famines are generally ascribed to a year when in fact they span a few. The famine is described at 1943 but in fact it started well before and was not fully relieved in 1944. Casualty estimates vary from 1 to 3 million. So a lot of people and it pretty amazing it was not seen as a global disaster at the time, but it really was not.

Modern economists maintain that famines are never about a shortage of food which is often plentiful in the region. Rather, they argue the food has not been got to the point of need often because of a war or smoother social disruption. That seems to be true on Bengal in 1943. There was plenty of surplus food in other regions of India but such was the uncertainty of war, the regions were unwilling to give it up to feed Bengal.

There was some other causes, all very disputed. They include that there was a policy of removing surplus food to ensure if the Japanese invaded there would be none for them. Surplus food in Bengal is a tenuous concept given how common hunger was generally.

There was a newly industrialised Calcutta to feed. Workers in factories were making ammunition and this meant food was being diverted for that purpose.

There was a war, so food was controlled indeed there was rationing in UK. But Indian economists have pointed out that most measurements of public health in UK went up, even during rationing, whereas in Bengal there was a famine. Rationing and food control done properly should not lead to a famine.

It is a subjective judgement but there was an attitude in the British Raj that famines were a feature of Bengal, too many people with too little land, often flooded. This attitude prevailed not just in 1943 but well before.

So what did this mean for the Battle of Imphal. Not certain yet but here are some thoughts.

Chandra Bose, the INA leader with the Japanese in 1944 was spreading a narrative of India on the verge of insurrections. He was Bengali himself and the famine certainly fed the narrative he put forward. It turned out to be false but he was believed at the time. Thus, the Bengal Famine played a part in the Japanese making the wrong intelligence assessment of the situation in India.

As noted before, few troops at Imphal were from Bengal. Most were from other parts of India. So there was not much direct impact on units.


Imphal; The Japanese Ardennes.

In WW2 there was a Japanese soldiers’ saying: Java was Heaven; Burma was Hell, but from Guinea you never came back. 

Burma was a relatively small operation and about 10 times more Japanese soldiers died in Guinea. (Guinea was the route to Australia which Japan had originally wanted to invade) In March 1944 the bulk of the Japanese Army was in China. But Burma was the north east flank of  a defined strategic Circle of Defence.  This was defined in 1943 when things started to go badly for the Japanese. So it was not that India had to be invaded, but Burma had to be held.

However, Japanese doctrine learned from the Germans, did not really allow for defence. As soon a commander saw he was about to be attacked, the response was to attack somewhere pre-emptively, So, as soon as it was clear the British were planning to re take Burma, Japanese doctrine called for an offensive to pre-empt it. Doctrine aside, Burma was a vast area to defend and the number of Japanese troops too few to hold it. An attack was an obvious course of action.

U Go which was the Japanese name for their offensive operation suffered from being 2 plans in one operation. Commanders most certainly did not Select and Maintain the Aim. The commanding General Renya Mutaguchi, wanted to invade the whole of India, Almost everyone else on the Japanese staff knew this was impossible and so agreed to the operation on the basis that if it petered out even a few kilometres over the Chindwin, then their defensive position would be improved. Of course, getting Imphal itself was the stated aim since the road went through the town which was therefore key to movement in either direction.  I will save for the book but there is a key bit of evidence that showed Mutaguchi wanted to invade India, everyone knew it, but no one stopped him. The blame for U Go goes far wider than Mutaguchi.

1943 had been a miserable year for the Japanese Burma Area Army. They had built roads, occupied but not controlled huge swathes of Burma, food and supplies were rare. There was not much to do besides chasing elusive Chindits who went, it seemed, wherever they pleased. Japanese morale was rock bottom.

Mutaguchi had plenty of bad luck. His divisional commanders were all bright top drawer squeaky-trousered staff officers – less Sato who went to Kohima who had combat experience. Lt Gen Yanagida (33 Div) who came up the Tiddim Road was repelled by the sight of the wounded and dead. Lt Gen Masafumi Yamauchi who came through Ukhrul bought his own western lavatory and was himself fatally ill on arrival. He was a graduate of US staff College at Fort Leavenworth Kansas. (I do want to pull his record from the Archive) The Infantry Commander of 33 Dvision was Maj Gen Tsunoru Yamamoto who lead the Tamu – Moreh, Pallel Axis. He was determined experienced and his performance showed it. The others were all against the U Go plan in the first place and said so. Lt Gen Sato, rather than give a rousing speech to troops on the eve of battle warned his division of high commands incompetence.  Command dysfunction was a feature of the Japanese command group. Sato, Mutaguchi and Kawabe Commander Burma Area Army, all had a fascinating prior relationship.

15th Dvision which was to advance in the the centre was held back in Siam building roads, incredibly, partly to sabotage the plan. They arrived late and poorly equipped. Again, the blame for the failure of U go goes wider than Mutaguchi.

The other important context was China which was central to both Allied and Japan strategy.   In March 1994 the Japanese were already thinking about Operation Ichi -Go, although it did not start until later on. This was a largely successful drive down the East Coast of China to capture bases and ensure that US bombers could not reach the Japanese mainland. The Japanese had seen what strategic bombing had done to Germany and in 1944 this was their chief fear. Of course, a success in Burma would allow a hook up with Ichi -go forces heading south. Ichi go was much larger operation than U go.

Finally, it is right to note that by 7 March 1944 the Japanese were losing the War and losing it badly. Shipping loses were high. It was difficult to get spares, efforts to create ammunition production around Rangoon had not been successful. Everyone had less than they needed.  But it was argued, none of this mattered too much since the Japanese soldier had unique fighting abilities and could prevail if given the chance.

Imphal 75 Years setting the Scene

It is 75 years since The Battle of Imphal . On this day 6 March 1944 the following important things had happened (or not happened)

The Japanese diversionary attack in Arkan,  to the south,  had failed. Not only had it not defeated in-place Allies but it had failed to draw major reserves from Imphal which had been its main goal. There was very little reaction to this failure on the Japanese side and certainly no pause. They also failed to note the very different behaviour of the Allies by staying put and fighting when surrounded. This was a major intelligence failure since it was clear to see and it probably should have impacted the optimistic Japanese Imphal planning assumptions. It did not.

In the middle of March Slim did perhaps his most brilliant act of foresight and generalship. He started the process, even before the Japanese had attacked, of lobbying to get 5th Division flown from the Arakan to the Imphal front. It was this act, in my view, which meant that Imphal was at risk for only the last few weeks of March 1944. Once 5th Division arrived the result was never in much doubt. Many will contest this and of course most of the fighting happened in April, May and June.  Japanese veterans community are bitter about much. That Imphal took place at all, (but I think the alternatives were impossible), that it was poorly planned ( certainly true) and that it went on long after the Generals knew it had failed. (True)

By the 6th March it was clear to Slim and Scoones on the Allied side that a major Japanese offensive on Imphal was imminent. Nevertheless, the order to the two Divisions in contact, 17th and 20th, remained to  re-invade Burma. The plans to withdraw and fight near Imphal were issued but were heavily caveated and only known to battalion commander and above. British Divisions were not yet in a defence posture, or mindset. This much was understandable but it led to a major and avoidable error on the part of Slim and Scoones but I will not elaborate here or at least not now.

Finally India. One the one hand it was a source of almost infinite resources when compared to the Japanese. The British had developed a decent defence production capacity around Calcutta. There were many Indians who might still be recruited to the Army. There were regiments and formations that were yet to be deployed to the Imphal front and training infrastructure to create more of them. There was plenty of food in India as a whole but of course tragically little in Bengal. There was a railway network in place.

On the other hand, the Japanese believed that India was in turmoil, Gandhi was in an out of jail, riots were common and it was clear the British were going to have to give up India. This was all true. So the Japanese believed, the Indian Army would not fight and victory at Imphal would be easy. This was emphatically not true and never was likely. The Indian Army came from Northern India, and now Pakistan and Nepal. Pushtoons, Punjabis, Sikhs and especially Gurkhas who were loyal to their regiments and via pensions and patronage, did well out of the Raj in general.  Fight they most certainly did.



Authors Note

I am in Delhi and about to once again visit the Battlefield of Imphal on what will be exactly the 75 year anniversary. This time I will travel there by train (38 hours) and go on into the Kabaw Valley in Northern Burma, mainly to find the Japanese river crossing points across the Chindwin.  I see this as an analysis history ie not a narrative as such. The latter has been well done by many others. I have spent many weeks in Japan met and interviewed veterans and their families, spent time in archives. Thus, I hope I  bring some new Japanese perspectives to the story but also make some new analysis connections.

After some 4 years of research there is now a framework to this analysis. Over the next 4 weeks, when the internet allows,  I will share snippets and thoughts. Please respond, argue, contest since I know there is lots of expertise out there. My book is half done and such comments can only help.


Visit to Japan Oct 2018

I spent the month of October 2018 in Japan doing research in archives but also meeting veterans of Imphal and the families of veterans.

I also visited the Museum of Special Operations at Chiran in the south near Nagasaki. Special Operations refers to what in the west is call the Kamakaze programme. Kamakaze is a word Japanese never use in relation to the programme. My main take away was that the programme was very costly in terms of pilots, obviously. In the early days when the pilots were new recruits it made more sense than towards the end when even flying instructors were going on missions. The greatest number of missions were during the Battle of Okinawa which was of course the Japanese homeland even if not the mainland. There was also an air assault special operation in which 18, as I recall, paratroopers landed on a  US airfield and destroyed aircraft units they were all killed.

I spent lots of time in the archive supported by excellent translators and not a few historians who helped. I also met and interviewed Takao-san a veteran of Imphal. He was a battalion commanders runner in 214 Regiment ie on the southern Tiddim Road axis. His unit got as close to Imphal as any Japanese Unit. Again no spoilers but he spoke about condensed milk in the container dropped for Allied troops.

He also said they liked fighting the British who were complete gentlemen and best of all mostly slept at night. Whereas, he said Japanese officers had them running around fruitlessly at night. From what I know this rings true. He said much more that was fascinating.

I was also able to fill  in a good deal of detail on the Japanese axis on Shenam Ridge which for a period was their main effort. The Commander there, Major Gen Yamamoto  was much keener on the whole Imphal plan than the other Divisional commanders and of course he had road along which supplies could be brought to him. His force, was put under the direct commander of 15th Army and then apparently BAA although I still want to verify this.

The veterans families were angry with “Mutaguchi and anyone who listened to him” which of course meant the chain of command right up to Prime Minister Tojo. There are two source of anger. One that such a poorly planned operation was allowed in the first place given its low chance of success. On this point I am sympathetic to Mutaguchi and Kawabe in BAA. They had few good choices and Japanese doctrine of the time was clear that when you were threatened with attack, you did not defend; you attacked. The second point of anger for veterans is the Battle went on long after it was clear it had failed. Since most of the Japanese casualties occurred in the second half ie after 1 April 1944. This is harder to defend not least since by May and June it was Tokyo and Singapore who were asking for one last effort. BAA badly needed the troops in northern Burma were the front was in danger of collapsing as a result of Chinese attacks.

Other highlights include

  • Slim/Scoones made a significant planning mistake and was lucky that 20 Division was not trapped at the same time as 17th.
  • Half of the ammunition intended for Kohima was lost to allies air and Chindits. Also, a Japanese regiment was left behind to counter Chindits so all told I am not sure the Chindits get the credit they were due.
  • Spare a thought for the Japanese soldier sent back to Army Headquarters to get the gift of tobacco from the Emperor for the attacking troops. He also given a bottle of Sake but this was for the officers and of course breakable. In the carnage and confusion of the Chindwin crossings, somewhere in there was this soldier nursing the Sake trying to get back to his unit with it in tact.

So much more to say. Must keep writing. Do follow this blog.